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Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. 
 
 
We care not only about how people treat us, but also what they believe of us. If I believe 
that you're a bad tipper given your race, I've wronged you. But, what if you are a bad tipper? 
It is commonly argued that the way racist beliefs wrong is that the racist believer either 
misrepresents reality, organizes facts in a misleading way that distorts the truth, or engages in 
fallacious reasoning. In this paper, I present a case that challenges this orthodoxy: the case of 
the supposedly rational racist. We live in a world that has been, and continues to be, 
structured by racist attitudes and institutions. As a result, the evidence might be stacked in 
favour of racist beliefs. But, if there are racist beliefs that reflect reality and are rationally 
justified, what could be wrong with them? Moreover, how do I wrong you by believing what 
I epistemically ought believe given the evidence? 
 
To address this challenge, we must recognize that there are not only epistemic norms 
governing belief, but moral ones as well. This view, however, is at odds with the assumption 
that moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack with regard to our 
beliefs. This background assumption motivates many philosophers to try to explain away the 
appearance that beliefs can wrong by locating the wrong elsewhere, e.g., in an agent’s action. 
Further, even accounts that accept the thesis that racist beliefs can wrong restrict the class of 
beliefs that wrong to beliefs that are either false or the result of hot irrationality, e.g., the racist 
belief is a result of ill-will. In this paper I argue that although these accounts will capture 
many of the wrongs associated with racist beliefs, they will be only partial explanations 
because they cannot explain the wrong committed by the supposedly rational racist. The 
challenge posed by the supposedly rational racist concerns our epistemic practices in a non-
ideal world. The world is an unjust place, and there may be many morally objectionable 
beliefs it justifies. To address this challenge, we must  seriously consider the thesis that 
people wrong others in virtue of what they believe about them, and not just in virtue of what 
they do.  
 
1. The Motivating Challenge 
It is not up for debate that we live in a world that has been shaped by, and continues to be 
shaped by, racist attitudes and racist institutions. From the transatlantic slave trade, to anti-
miscegenation laws, lynchings, redlining, and voter identification laws that “target African-																																																								
1 I owe a large debt of gratitude to (in alphabetical order) the following people for lots of enlightening 
comments and discussions: Mike Ashfield, Renee Bolinger, Kenny Easwaran, Maegan Fairchild, Stephen 
Finlay, Georgi Gardiner, Liz Harman, Pamela Hieronymi, Gabbrielle Johnson, Tanya Kostochka, Zi Lin, Jessie 
Munton, Mark Schroeder, Ralph Wedgwood, various other graduate students and faculty at USC, several 
anonymous reviewers, and audience members at Athena in Action and the Penn-Rutgers-Princeton Social 
Epistemology Workshop where this paper was presented under the title “Motivating Ethical Demands on 
Belief”. 
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Americans with almost surgical precision”, racism is an unfortunate part of the fabric of our 
world.2 It should not be surprising, then, that as a result of structural racism, there may be 
morally objectionable beliefs that are well-supported by the evidence. Further, some of the 
morally objectionable beliefs could be paradigmatic examples of racist beliefs. Although my 
focus in this paper are racist beliefs and the ways they can wrong, what I say can also be 
easily extended to cover the possibility of rationally held sexist beliefs, homophobic beliefs, and 
other morally objectionable beliefs of this kind. The world is an unjust place and there may 
be many morally objectionable beliefs that it justifies. To see this, consider the following case 
that is the motivating puzzle of this paper. 
 
The Supposedly Rational Racist. You shouldn't have done it. But you did. You 
scrolled down to the comments section of an article concerning the state of race 
relations in America, and you are now reading the comments. The comments on 
such articles tend to be predictable, but there is one comment that catches your 
eye. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical 
violence, there is the following comment: “Although it might be ‘unpopular’ or 
‘politically incorrect’ to say this, I'm tired of constantly being called a racist 
whenever I believe of a black diner in my section that they will tip worse than 
the white diners in my section.” The user posting the comment, Spencer, argues 
that the facts don't lie, and he helpfully reproduces those facts. For example, he 
links to studies that show that on average black diners tip substantially less than 
white diners. The facts, he insists, aren’t racist. If you were to deny his claims 
and were to believe otherwise, it would be you who is engaging in wishful 
thinking. It would be you who believes against the evidence. It would be you, not 
Spencer, who is epistemically irrational. 
 
If we could dismiss Spencer’s comment on the grounds that he is making a mistake, there 
would be no need to continue reading. The challenge posed by Spencer is that we cannot so 
easily dismiss his comment. From a study by Lynn (2006), there is  evidence of racial 
disparities in tipping practices that support Spencer’s belief that the black diner in his section 
won’t tip well. Perhaps Spencer is, as he suggests, rationally believing in accordance with the 
evidence. Although his belief might seem racist and as such irrational, perhaps he is not guilty 
of making any kind of epistemic fault. That is, perhaps he is not misinterpreting the evidence 
or cherry-picking statistics to justify his pre-held prejudices. Perhaps the belief isn’t the result 
of ill-will or hostility. Perhaps Spencer is right in his claim that it is not his fault that as a 
result of structural racism the evidence is stacked in favour of racist beliefs. Given that our 
world is racist, some of our beliefs will also be racist (see also Gendler 2011). 
 
A rational racist, however, sounds like an oxymoron. Racism is often regarded as 
definitionally involving standard epistemic flaws such as false beliefs, obscuring or 
concealing or disregarding relevant information, organizing facts in a misleading way, and/or 
engaging in fallacious reasoning. For example, as Shelby (2016, pp. 22) argues, “in its most 
basic form, racism is an ideology: a widely held set of associated beliefs and implicit judgments 
that misrepresent significant social realities and function, through this distortion, to bring 																																																								
2 Regarding North Carolina's discriminatory voter ID law, see: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/politics/voter-id-laws-supreme-court-north-carolina.html?  
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about or perpetuate unjust social relations.”3 The problem thus posed by the supposedly 
rational racist is that Spencer does not seem to be committing one of these standard 
epistemic flaws, but his belief nonetheless seems racist, and by believing what he does—i.e., 
that the black individual in his section will tip poorly—he seems to commit a wrong. But, if 
he is not guilty of an epistemic flaw, then it seems that we are at a loss to explain what wrong 
he commits. 
 
Perhaps the reason we are at a loss to explain what wrong Spencer commits is that Spencer 
is not committing a wrong. Sometimes there are unpleasant things that we ought believe. For 
example, it might be unpleasant for me to believe that one day soon my favourite television 
show will come to an end (RIP Battlestar Galactica); nonetheless, it is something I must 
accept, and it would be irrational for me to believe otherwise. This is precisely the line that 
Spencer advocates: there is at least some value to having accurate beliefs, even when those 
beliefs are unpleasant. The beliefs that Spencer holds, however, are not merely unpleasant. 
The beliefs that Spencer holds seem racist. But, again, one might counter that although the 
beliefs seem racist, it would be wrong to call them racist given that they reflect reality. 
 
The challenge, then, is to explain why we should call Spencer's belief racist if his beliefs 
reflect reality and seem to be rationally justified. Perhaps by calling such a belief racist we are 
contributing to a conceptual inflation of the term and thereby making it less powerful for 
calling out things that are actually racist. Perhaps it is not racist to believe a black diner won't 
tip well. This is the challenge posed by the supposedly rational racist. 
 
This is a troubling conclusion. I am not as willing as Spencer to give up on the compelling 
idea that there is something wrong with what he believes even if it might accurately reflect 
reality. Assuming the reader shares this hesitancy, this leaves us with the task of figuring out 
what Spencer does wrong. 
 
As we move forward with this task, there is one assumption and one constraint I ask the 
reader to take on. First, I will be assuming that by believing what he does, Spencer seems to 
commit a wrong. If we take it as given that Spencer commits a wrong, our task becomes 
explaining what wrong Spencer commits. To reject this assumption is to reject that there is a 
challenge posed by Spencer. That is, if Spencer does not commit a wrong, there is no puzzle 
that needs to be explained. The case of the supposedly rational racist, however, is puzzling 
because of how compelling this assumption is, i.e., that Spencer commits a wrong wrong by 
believing what he does. 
 
You may, however, still push back and ask why we should think that Spencer's belief is 
racist. What is so racist about believing that black diners won't tip well? To answer this, I 
must take a step back. The task of the paper is to take a paradigmatically racist belief, e.g., 
black diners do not tip well, and see what resources a supposedly rational racist can muster 
in defense of the epistemic grounds of such a belief in order to demonstrate that even the 
best argument for how the belief might be rational held does not succeed.4 																																																								
3 This is a commonly shared view. See for example, Appiah (1990), Ikuenobe (2011), Lengbeyer (2004), Clough 
and Loges (2008), etc. I will explore similar accounts in more detail in Section 4. 4	I have made the conscious choice to use this belief, one regarding tipping practices, over others because (i) it 
is commonly accepted as being racist, and (ii) it doesn't require invoking the more offensive claims about black 
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There is still further question of explaining which beliefs wrong others. That is, the job fully 
of accounting the wrongs of racist beliefs is incomplete until we have a clear statement of 
the way in which the beliefs that are racist are racist. This is a large question and one that 
cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. The goal of this paper, despite the grandiose 
title, is more modest. The goal of this paper is to just make space for the idea that beliefs can 
wrong. The next task is to then explain which beliefs wrong. Just as we recognize that we 
can wrong others through the acts we commit but that not all acts wrong, we can recognize 
that there should be a way to delineate beliefs with racial content that are racist and wrong and 
beliefs with racial content that are not racist and do not wrong. For the time being, however, I must 
just ask the reader to follow me in granting that the belief that Spencer holds at the very least 
seems racist and seems to wrong. With that granted, we can explore where that wrong 
should be located. 
 
Further, I also ask the reader to take on the following constraint on the range of acceptable 
answers to the case of the supposedly rational racist: when giving an explanation of the 
wrong committed by Spencer, we should, as much as possible, do our best to grant Spencer 
his conception of himself. 5  Spencer is not merely a philosopher's concoction to 
counterexample or test the limits of a proposed theory. Spencer exists. Ideally, we wish not 
only to explain the wrong/s that Spencer commits in believing what he does, we also do not 
want to rule out the possibility of engaging with Spencer. Engagement, however, requires 
working with this constraint and not speculating about the nature of Spencer's psychology or 
making claims about various character flaws he might exhibit. To engage, ideally we should 
strive for a response to Spencer that would show that we can grant his conception of himself 
and still, by his own lights, he should not believe what he believes. This will be the guiding 
assumption as we proceed. 
 
2. Beliefs Aren't Racist: Locating the Wrong Downstream from 
Belief 
Our task is to explain the wrong Spencer commits. In this section, my focus is on downstream 
accounts of the wrong. According to downstream accounts of the wrong, it is not the belief 
itself that wrongs: rather, it is the downstream effects of the beliefs that wrong, e.g., the 																																																								
people that are often invoked that are problematic in their own right. In short, I cannot answer why we should 
think that Spencer's belief is racist if you do not already accept (or are willing to grant) that it is a racist belief. 
To explain why it is racist would lead to a further question that cannot be adequately addressed in the space of 
this paper. 
5 You might worry, as an anonymous referee has worried, that that this constraint seems to conflate a 
theoretical task – explaining what makes Spencer’s belief racist and what makes it wrong – with the pragmatic 
task of engaging fruitfully with Spencer. I do not have a direct argument that Spencer's self-conception is 
correct, instead what I hope to provide is a suggestive argument that it would be disappointing if there could be 
no wrong if Spencer’s self-conception is correct. If that is how things turn out, then we although we might 
have all the theoretical resources we need to diagnose real-life Spencers whose self-conceptions are not 
completely accurate, we cannot engage with them. They, after all, think they are in a better position than us to 
know whether they have been dispassionately rational or biased in forming their belief. It is thus helpful to 
have this pragmatic constraint guiding the theoretical task of explaining what makes Spencer’s belief racist. It 
may, nonetheless, turn out that the right answer to the theoretical question—what makes Spencer's belief 
wrong—involves attributing to Spencer an epistemic mistake or a moral failing, and as a result, we shouldn't 
grant Spencer his self-conception of himself. Nonetheless, the pragmatic constraint that we should, as much as 
possible, do our best to grant Spencer his conception of himself should constrain how we approach the 
theoretical question. 
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agent’s actions. Spencer only does something wrong given what he believes insofar as he acts 
on what he believes. Here is the intuitive thought behind such accounts: we have been 
assuming that what Spencer believes is an accurate reflection of the evidence. Now we can 
ask, how might Spencer wrong a black diner by simply believing that they are going to tip less 
well than a white diner? Surely he doesn't wrong the black diner unless he treats the black 
diner differently than the white diner. For example, it is clear that he would wrong the black 
diner if he were to provide worse service on the basis of the diner’s race. But, if he simply 
believes? What’s the harm (or wrong) in that? If no racist actions follow from the belief, then 
according to the downstream theorist he does not do anything wrong. The downstream 
theorist, thus, can accept a restricted version of my claim that people wrong each other in 
virtue of what they believe about each other: people wrong each other in virtue of what they 
believe about each other but only insofar as how they treat each other is a reflection of what 
they believe about each other.  
 
As we can see in this formulation, it is implicitly assumed that our beliefs toward one 
another are beyond the purview of what’s regarded as proper or improper treatment. There 
are two reasons for this restriction. The first is an assumption about control and 
responsibility: moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack with regard 
to our beliefs. If you accept this assumption, then you would be driven to locate the wrong 
downstream from belief in something that we do have voluntary control over, i.e., what we 
say and what we do. The second reason stems from a worry about the conceptual inflation 
of the term ‘racism’. If you are concerned that the terms ‘racism’ and ‘racist’ are being over-
applied and losing their force as terms of moral reproach, you might be driven to reserve the 
term ‘racism' and ‘racist' for the worst race-based harms, and be disinclined to apply the 
terms to what an agent believes. Although distinct reasons, both reasons can be summed up 
with the following slogan: beliefs don't wrong people, people wrong people. Alternatively, 
people wrong people through their words and through their deeds, not simply what they 
believe. 
 
I turn now to considering the case for downstream accounts of the wrong in more detail. As 
I’ll show, such an account will be too narrow in scope. It will fail to capture the more subtle, 
insidious, and more prevalent forms of racism. Further, there is intuitive reason to think that 
the demand for proper treatment extends to what people believe of us, not simply how they 
act towards us or what they say of us. Although this would put us at odds with the 
assumption about control and responsibility, there might be reason to think that that 
assumption may not be as strong as it is commonly assumed to be. I leave the argument for 
that point, however, to Section 5. Let us begin, then, with the concern about the conceptual 
inflation of the term of ‘racism' and why that leads us to locate the wrong of racist beliefs 
solely in the actions of an agent. 
 
A prominent example of an argument for why the wrong of racism is located only in action 
comes from Corlett (2005). Corlett argues that the only kinds of ethnic prejudice and 
discrimination that rise to the level of racism, what he calls “racism proper”, are overt 
negative actions or inactions that are harmful and hurtful to victims. Further, these actions 
or inactions must be egregious enough to be punished by law. His grounds for arguing this 
come from the belief that “it does little good (though I suppose some good, on some 
occasions) to call something racist when the law cannot and should not effectively deal with 
it” (pp. 578-9). 
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There are two parts to Corlett's view that we need to keep separate. The first claim is that 
“racism proper” is located only in action, and the second is that actions and inactions that 
the law cannot and should not deal with are rightly excluded from “racism proper”. The 
second claim is Corlett’s grounds for the first. There are, however, good reasons for rejecting 
the second assumption. But first, why might we want to delineate a special case of racist 
wrongs as rising to the level of racism proper? For this argument, we must turn to Blum’s 
(2002)’s influential distinction between, on the one hand, racist beliefs and racist actions and, 
on the other, and beliefs and actions that are merely racial in nature. 
 
Blum argues that the term ‘racism’ has been the victim of a conceptual inflation. The term 
has been overused and, in serving as a term of moral reproach, it has joined other vices such 
as dishonesty, cruelty, hypocrisy, etc. Blum argues that we need a more varied and nuanced 
moral vocabulary in order to capture the sense in which not every instance of racial conflict, 
insensitivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or ignorance is “racist”. He 
argues that insensitivity,  ignorance, discomfort, etc. in actions and beliefs are lesser ills, and 
the term ‘racism' should be reserved for the worst race-based wrongs, rather than used to 
categorize and condemn all race-related ills. Applying this account to our case of Spencer, 
Corlett and Blum would say that Spencer’s belief might be morally bad in many ways, but it 
is not racist. 
 
However, this policing of when the term ‘racism’ can be employed is problematic. Racism 
takes various forms and admits of degrees of wrong. Lynching, redlining, and the 
transatlantic slave trade are all particularly egregious examples of racism. Although being 
thought of as a bad tipper on the basis of your race is not as bad as not being allowed to 
marry outside of your race, it does not follow that the former is not racist. Blum makes the 
distinction because he is concerned with how dialogue about racism might be impeded by 
charges of “racism”. And Corlett makes this distinction between racism and “racism proper” 
because he is concerned with legal remedies in a racist society. But, as Shelby (2003, pp. 125) 
argues, these approaches downplay the value of using the term.6 
 
Many people in the US now think that racism is largely a problem of the past 
and are thus little concerned with racial issues. The expansive conception of 
racism with its strong negative valence could encourage those who are 
complacent to be more vigilant and circumspect in the racial realm. Perhaps they 
should accept the comparatively small burdens of hyperbolic uses of “racism” as 
the cost of achieving racial justice and of publicly affirming the humanity of 
those who are racially stigmatized.  
[...] 
Moreover, though many of Blum's “non-racist” race-related ills are lesser moral 
evils taken singly, their cumulative and wide-ranging impact on the life-chances 
of subordinate “races” creates a heavy burden that is properly thought of as a 
form of oppression. Calling these lesser wrongs “racist” reminds us of the 
seriousness of these sources of disadvantage, even if their perpetrators are not 
moral monsters. 																																																								
6 Blum later changes his mind in Blum (2004) and argues that there is a plurality of racial ills that could all be 
regarded as racist. 
Please cite the final version. 
	 7	
These considerations allow us to reject attempts to distinguish between different degrees of 
the wrong, e.g. racial wrong, racism, and racism proper, and argue that there is good reason 
for calling all the ills that fall on that spectrum racist or instances of racism. And although 
Corlett’s argument for locating the wrong of racism solely in action or inaction rested on the 
assumption that there was a special class of wrong, i.e., racism proper, that could only be 
located in action or inaction, we have not yet undermined the intuitive case for thinking that 
the wrong of racism resides only in action. So, let me now turn to providing this intuitive 
case and then challenging it. 
 
Ferguson. Consider Officers Stella and Stanley who are told in their morning 
briefing that the latest statistics available suggest that 92% of black residents in 
their neighbourhood have open arrest warrants. Later, they go on their separate 
patrols and each see a black resident. They both form the belief that the black 
resident has an open arrest warrant. Stella uses this belief to stop the resident 
and run their name through the database to see if they should be taken in to the 
precinct. Stanley, too believes that the resident he encounters has an open arrest 
warrant: however, he chooses not to stop the resident for other reasons. Stanley 
knows that the justice system is corrupt and that his other police officers have 
been using warrants and fines on the residents as a way of padding the municipal 
budget. So, although he believes that this resident has an open arrest warrant, he 
doesn't act on the belief.7 
 
The difference in moral blame between Stella and Stanley suggests that it is not just what they 
believe that is morally problematic. If it were the case that the one belief that some resident 
has an open arrest warrant were morally problematic, then both Stella and Stanley would be 
just as bad as one another. But, Stanley seems commendable whereas Stella does not. Thus, 
it seems that what distinguishes them is how they act on the basis of their beliefs. But, if we 
focus on just the acts, however, we'll fail to capture other ways in which we can wrong one 
another. In contrast with the case given above, now consider the hermit in the woods who 
holds racist beliefs.  
 
The Racist Hermit. The racist hermit in the woods will never interact with the 
disadvantaged person he believes something negative of, he will never interact 
with or contribute to the institutional structures of racism. He may be a product 
of these institutional structures, but we are hard pressed to say that he 
contributes to them given his isolation. But, suppose that he comes to believe 
that Sanjeev smells like curry. How did he come to form this belief given his 
isolation from society? Let us just suppose that he discovered some trash on the 
ground which happened to be an alumni newsletter from Sanjeev's university 
that included a picture of him. Upon seeing that picture, the hermit believes of 																																																								
7 This statistic is loosely based on the Department of Justice's investigation of the Ferguson police department 
which found that 62% of residents had open arrest warrants, and of those residents, 92% were black. On Aug 
25, 2015, a municipal court judge in Ferguson issued an order to withdraw all arrest warrants issued in 
Ferguson before Dec 31, 2014 due to the Ferguson police and the city's municipal court pattern and practice of 
discrimination against African-Americans. If you are worried that this case seems contrived, I note that in 
neighboring predominantly black municipalities, the ratios are even worse. For example, in Country Club Hills 
there are 33,102 active warrants for a population of 1,381. Similarly, in Wellston there are 15,000 outstanding 
warrants for a population of 2,460. 
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the pictured person—Sanjeev—that he smells of curry. Now, suppose also that 
Sanjeev happens to have recently made curry so in this instance the hermit's 
belief is true—Sanjeev does smell of curry. Has the hermit wronged Sanjeev?  
 
According to the downstream theorist, the hermit does not (nor cannot) wrong Sanjeev 
because Sanjeev will never learn of the hermit's belief. However, neither harm nor 
knowledge are a prerequisite for being wronged. For example, if Sanjeev's partner were to 
cheat on him but he never found out, it is a commonly accepted intuition that Sanjeev would 
still have been wronged.  
 
To continue pressing this point that we care not only how people act towards us and what 
they say about us, but also the attitudes they hold of us, consider the following related case. 
 
The Security Guard. Jake is a security guard at a fancy department store. He hates 
the company he works for, and he couldn't care less if people shoplift and cost 
the company money. One day, as Jada leaves the department store Jake works 
at, he believes that Jada shoplifted the purse she's carrying. But, given his 
contempt for his company, he chooses not to intervene. He acts exactly as he 
would act if he had believed that that was Jada's purse and that she hadn't stolen 
it. Has Jada been wronged by what Jake believes of her? 
 
I want to press the intuition that Jada has been wronged by what Jake believes of her. If we 
put ourselves in Jada's shoes, we don't want people to believe of us that we stole the purse. 
We care what people believe about us.8 The problem, then, with downstream accounts of the 
wrong is that they are at best partial explanations of the wrongs of racist beliefs. It is right 
that people wrong each other in virtue of what they believe about each other insofar as how 
they treat each other is a reflection of what they believe about each other. However, the ways 
in which we can treat each other poorly include not only our words and our deeds, but also 
what we believe of each other. 
 
Earlier I had summed up the reasons in favour of locating the wrongs of racist beliefs 
downstream from belief with the following slogan: beliefs don't wrong people, people wrong 
people. We can still preserve some of the intuitive force of this slogan while nonetheless 
recognizing that in the cases given above you are wronged by what someone believes of you. 
We must simply recognize that one of the ways in which people wrong people is by having 
beliefs about people, not simply what they do or say. 
 
 																																																								
8 If you are having difficulty with this intuition, consider the following analogous case from the movie Pretty 
Woman. Vivian Ward, played by Julia Roberts, is an escort who has been hired by Richard Gere's character, 
Edward Lewis. Edward gives Vivian money for a new wardrobe. Vivian visits a store in Beverly Hills, and the 
first shot when she enters the store is the reaction from the workers in the store. Although she reminds them 
she has money to spend in the store, the clerks refuse to believe her and ask her to leave. Although it seems like 
the wrong committed in this case concerns how the store clerks acted towards Vivian, you need only ask almost 
anyone you know with a darker tint what it feels like in a store where  people believe you will shoplift. They 
may not always follow you around, they may not always act any differently towards you, but that they believe 
you will steal, or that they believe you can't afford anything in the store, etc. hurt. For more on these cases, see 
Basu (2018, chapter 2). 
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3. Locating the Wrongs Upstream From Belief 
I have now shown the shortcomings of an account that locates the wrong of racist beliefs 
solely in the downstream effects of the belief. However, those wanting to resist the thesis 
that beliefs wrong have the option to locate the wrong elsewhere still, namely upstream. In 
this section, I turn my attention to accounts that attempt to locate the wrong of racist beliefs 
upstream from belief. Upstream features of a racist belief include the many processes that 
contribute to the agent forming the belief. On such a view, we could resist the thesis that 
beliefs can wrong, and instead say that what goes wrong in the case of Spencer is the result 
of his cognitive predispositions or limitations. Alternatively, perhaps the ways he gathers and 
evaluates evidence, i.e., his epistemic practices, are flawed. Alternatively, still, the flaws lay in 
problematic motivations and affective attitudes that are guiding his belief formation. On 
such an account, beliefs aren’t themselves wrong, rather they are but a symptom of a set of 
states and processes that result in the belief. Further, although this set of state and processes 
that result in the belief might itself include other beliefs, the problematic beliefs are merely 
symptoms of a defect in the cognitive system. We can illustrate this distinction between 
locating the wrong downstream from belief and locating the wrong upstream from belief 





We can see an example of this upstream strategy in the case of stereotypes. Stereotypes are 
helpful in guiding us through the world. As McGarty et al. (2002) note, stereotypes are not 
only aids to explanation, they are also energy-saving devices or heuristics. Not only are 
stereotypes devices that we form to help us understand the world, but also they also help us 
understand the world by saving us time and effort. After all, by treating people as members 
of a group rather than individuals, we can save energy by ignoring the diverse and detailed 
information about each. However, because we live in a complex social environment, by 
taking shortcuts we often adopt biased and erroneous perceptions of the world. So, rather 
than being aids to understanding, a common thought is that stereotypes are aids to 
misunderstanding more often than they aid in understanding. So, although stereotypes can 
																																																								
9 Thanks to Jessie Munton for first illustrating this distinction in a similar way when presenting comments on 
this paper at Athena in Action. 
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assist with explanation, they problematically produce falsehoods and distortions due to 
upstream features of our cognitive system.10 
 
Further, stereotyping not only problematically produces falsehoods and distortions, it does 
so in a way that is so systematic that it cannot be trusted. Leslie (2015) for example, argues 
that stereotypes can problematically lead to the possession of generic beliefs if that group is 
perceived to share an underlying essence. For Leslie these “striking-property 
generalizations”—e.g., sharks attack bathers, mosquitos carry West Nile—are formed 
because they treat a group as having an underlying essence that predisposes them to some 
activity or character trait. Further, our cognitive system is such that we more readily form 
and endorse these generalizations, and in turn beliefs with generic content, when they are 
negative. In sum, the stereotype itself may be unproblematic. There could, perhaps, be 
creatures who could unproblematically hold stereotypes concerning groups and do nothing 
wrong in doing so.11 But given our own cognitive limitations and predispositions, stereotypes 
wrong. Further, it is not the belief in the stereotype that wrongs, rather, the wrong lies 
upstream from the belief. 
 
For another example, perhaps the belief itself does not wrong but given our cognitive 
predispositions and limitations, we can reasonably expect that the belief will interact with 
other frame-working beliefs, cognitive biases, etc. in highly systematic and structuring ways. 
This kind of wrong is tied closely to the the essential functional role of belief. Our beliefs 
prepare us for more beliefs of the same kind. That is, our beliefs guide us in assessing new 
evidence as it comes in. This is how priors work. If Spencer has good reason to think that 
his priors are going to lead him to update on evidence in morally problematic ways, then his 
failure to appreciate this risk is the wrong he commits. What he believes about black diners 
in his section is what we could call a risky amplifying belief. The belief itself is of neutral value, 
but once it enters a prejudiced cognitive system, it will have negative effects. Further, the 
fault lies not with the belief, but rather the prejudiced cognitive system.12 
 
You don’t have to be explicitly racist or sexist or any other kind of –ist to see this amplifying 
effect. We live in a world that has been shaped by and continues to be shaped by racist 
attitudes and racist institutions. So, no matter how well intentioned we are when we add the 
belief, we may end up with a racist amplified belief set. To see this, consider the cognitive 
saint—someone who doesn't have any racist background beliefs, assumptions, or biases—
and as such can add the belief this black diner will not tip well or Sanjeev smells of curry without any 
untoward consequences, and perhaps ought to. The worry is that the mere addition of the 
belief could cause the entire framework to become biased. The addition of the belief might 
itself mark the beginning of an implicit association of the sort “black=poor” or 
“black=bad”. As IAT studies have shown us (see Banaji and Greenwald 2013), many people 
in the US have negative associations of this type towards African Americans. Although, 
there is still a lot of work to be done to figure out the exact nature and role that these biases 																																																								
10 This is a simplified discussion of stereotypes and stereotyping. For a more nuanced and careful discussion, 
see Beeghly (2015) and Antony (2016). 
11 For example, I can unproblematically hold as my stereotype of a dog the image of Labrador retriever, but it 
doesn’t follow from my possession of that stereotype that I also accept the generic claim that “Dogs are 
Labrador retrievers”. Thanks again to an anonymous referee for this point. 
12 Note that a risky amplifying belief could also be a stereotype, but not all risky amplifying beliefs are 
stereotypes. I owe the term “risky amplifying belief” to a conversation with Renee Bolinger. 
Please cite the final version. 
	 11	
play in the cognitive framework, it is not unreasonable to suspect that increased exposure to 
these sorts of beliefs can create piggybacking associations of the form that I'm concerned 
about.13 
 
In light of these examples, we might want to say that what we believe isn’t bad on it’s own. 
But, given that the way these cognitive biases work they’re often invisible to us. So, we have 
reason to be skeptical about whether we can add the belief unproblematically. So, we should 
exercise extreme caution (up to and including avoidance) in adding these sorts of things to 
our own belief set. A problem, however, with this account is that it's not clear we can clearly 
demarcate the wrong upstream or whether the wrong is in what we might call the whole stream. 
That is, the wrong lies in the evidence that sparks the belief and how that belief interacts 
with upstream features of an agent’s cognitive framework.  
 
A further problem is that one of the reasons that the thesis that beliefs can wrong seems so 
unintuitive is because it clashes with the following commonly accepted thesis about control, 
responsibility, and belief: moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack 
with regard to our beliefs. As I'll show in Section 5, although this assumption is often treated 
as a settled matter of orthodoxy it is up for debate whether we have sufficient control over 
our beliefs (or whether control is even need) for deontic notions to apply to belief. However, 
if we take this intuition about control and responsibility seriously, then although it 
commonly stands in the way of the plausibility of the thesis that beliefs can wrong, here it 
actually pushes us towards locating the wrong in belief rather than in upstream features that 
causally impact the belief.  
 
Presumably we have less control over the upstream features than what we lack with regard 
to our beliefs. As noted earlier, the way in which our cognitive predispositions, limitations, 
biases, etc. work are often invisible to us. Believing that Jamal will tip less well than James 
may lead us on a path that makes it easier to form negative beliefs about black individuals we 
interact with. We have less control over what happens in our cognitive system after we 
believe than we do before we settle the belief.  
 
The upstream theorist would say that the bad thing is whatever cognitive framework allows 
Spencer to (on the basis of adopting the belief) make a bunch of other terrible decisions. 
But, the bit that wrongs is the framework, not the other bad beliefs or decisions that result 
on the basis of it. But if the motivation for locating the wrong in the framework rather than 
the belief is that beliefs don't seem like the kind of things that wrong, the same can be said for 
an agent’s cognitive framework. How does a biased framework, by itself with no beliefs 
entering as inputs, wrong? This upstream account, thus has only a partial explanation of the 
wrong committed by Spencer. The wrong is not only in his cognitive limitations and 
predispositions, but it is also in what he believes.14 																																																								
13 See for example Mandelbaum (2016). For some of the controversy surrounding the IAT see Oswald et al. 
(2013) Oswald et al. (2015), Greenwald and Banaji (2015), and Madva and Brownstein (2016). Thanks to 
Gabbrielle Johnson for many conversations about implicit bias. 
14 For more on locating the wrong of racist and prejudiced beliefs in upstream features of an agent’s cognitive 
architecture see Begby (2013) and and Munton (MS). Begby argues that the reason why prejudices are 
epistemically insidious concerns how they become interalized as background beliefs that are recalcitrant to 
empirical counterevidence. Munton argues that the flaw in well-founded statistically accurate beliefs about 
certain demographics concerns how we tacitly ascribe the domain of the statistic in question. That is, there are 
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4. A Restricted Account of When Beliefs Can Wrong 
According to a standard way of thinking about the moral wrong of racism, when the wrong 
is located in belief there are two conditions that the wronging belief must satisfy. The first is 
the false condition—the belief is false—and the second is the hot condition—the false belief 
is accompanied by other negative qualities that the belief exhibits, e.g. being held in bad 
faith, being self-deceptive, being indicative of ill-will on the part of the believer etc. We can 
already see how such an account will not be able to explain what is morally objectionable 
about the supposedly rational racist. Although Spencer’s belief seems objectionable, it is not 
false. Spencer’s belief appears to be an accurate reflection of the weight of the evidence. 
Further, Spencer claims to harbour no feelings of ill will.  
 
I grant that in the vast majority of cases people who claim to be like Spencer satisfy either 
the false condition or the hot condition. The problem, then, with the accounts discussed in 
this section is not that they are incorrect. Rather, these accounts are incomplete. They 
foreclose the possibility of a character like the supposedly rational racist. But, as I argued in 
Section 1, there is good reason to think that there could be people like Spencer. Thus, my 
goal in this section is not to argue against these accounts. Rather, my goal is to show the 
limitations of these accounts when they are faced with the particular challenges raised by a 
character like Spencer. 
 
Let us begin with a prominent account of the wrong of racist beliefs from Appiah (1990, 
1995). Appiah argues that racism consists of two elements: racialism and racial prejudice. 
Racialism is a proposition about the existence of different races or racial essences. Racial 
prejudice is a disposition about the moral significance of a race because of some morally 
relevant racial properties. For example, one might think that some races are more primitive 
or barbaric than others. The belief rests on a false belief about the existence of different 
races or racial essences, and it also involves thinking that there are morally relevant racial 
properties, e.g. being more primitive or barbaric. According to this account, racial prejudice 
requires accepting a racialist belief, so one cannot have racial prejudice without accepting 
racialist beliefs.15 The epistemic wrong of racism, then, is a false belief about essences. The 
moral wrong of racism, then, is that it places unjustified moral significance on race. That is, 
the racist uses race as a basis for making moral distinctions, e.g., the racist uses race 
illegitimately as the sole basis for treating some people morally.  
 
Further, akin to the upstream accounts discussed in Section 3, part of the wrong of racism 
comes from the racist disposition that imbues in the believer a tendency to accept, morally 																																																								
often flaws in our implicit representation of the generality of statistics concerning the rates of violent crime, etc. 
As noted, I am in agreement that these accounts all get something right, they simply lack the resources to 
address the character of Spencer, and the peculiarities of the character of Spencer are my primary concern in 
this paper. 
15 Although Appiah himself does not think that these racial essences are biological, this account does seem to 
paint the racist as a biological essentialist. But, that is not necessary. For example, imagine a racist who doesn't 
believe that the differences are biological, merely cultural. For example, the racist who refuses to hire a Korean 
dogwalker because of the false belief that Koreans eat dogs. Again, we have a racial proposition Koreans eat dogs, 
which is false, and the disposition to treat their race (or culture) as being of moral significance because it 
indicates some morally relevant racial property. Alternatively, a clearer example of the cultural racist can be 
seen in cases involving resentment towards new immigrants from a particular country from the descendants of 
immigrants from that same country. 
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and theoretically, false propositions or beliefs that are hurtful, discriminatory, bigoted, etc. 
towards one race and not the other. This moral wrong leads to other bad epistemic practices 
such as accepting racist beliefs in the face of overwhelming evidence that should have led to 
giving up on those beliefs. In this regard, the wrong of racism is located in the beliefs of the 
agent, not their actions. Racism, thus, is a cognitive incapacity (see Mills 1997). 
 
Similarly, Gordon (1995, 2000) argues that racism is a character flaw, but specifically it is a 
flaw in one’s beliefs. Gordon’s account, then, is a bridge from the purely cognitive incapacity 
account of racism—where at its core the wrong of racism lies in a false belief and how that 
belief interacts with other beliefs—to an account that encompasses the other attitudes of the 
agent. For Gordon, racism is a character flaw because it is a reflection of one’s defective 
psychology, personality, or character. After all, if it were a mere matter of a false belief, then 
we wouldn’t be able to distinguish the merely ignorant racist who does not deserve moral 
approbation from the racist that does. Racism must be accompanied by some negative non-
cognitive attitudes. This leads us to Garcia’s (1996, 1997, 1999) suggestion that racism is a 
personal phenomenon of ill-will. This ill-will is often manifested in actions and perhaps 
helps create and sustain social institutions that contribute to the wrong of racism. The wrong 
of racism, thus, is this racial disregard. Here, we also hear echoes of  Arpaly and Schroeder’s 
(2014) conception of the wrong of prejudice more generally: those who have prejudices 
display some distinctive kind of epistemic irrationality that can be explained by a deficiency 
of good will. That is, they are ready to believe anything about a particular group as long as it 
is bad. The racist is guilty of a kind of hot irrationality.  
 
To summarize, according to accounts that locate the wrong of racism in what an agent 
believes, there are two distinct but closely related suggestions. First, the wrong is that the 
belief is false. Second, the wrong is not a mere false belief, but rather the false belief 
accompanied by ill-will, hatred, antipathy, etc. I call the first the false condition, and the second 
the hot condition. We have already seen that Spencer is not guilty of the false condition. We 
have been granting that Spencer’s belief is true. We have been granting that it seems to be 
rational for Spencer to believe that the black diner in his section will tip less well than the 
white diner in his section. Perhaps, however, Spencer is guilty of the hot condition. Perhaps 
his belief is epistemically irrational because it is the result of negative non-cognitive attitudes 
or ill-will. It is this diagnosis that I turn to considering now. 
 
Following Arpaly (2004, pp. 102), let us start with the following case. 
 
Boko Fittleworth (a character in a P.G. Wodehouse novel) overpowers and traps 
a man whom he spots hiding in his would-be-father-in-law's garden shed at 
midnight, because he believes this man to be a burglar. In fact, the man is not a 
burglar but a business tycoon whose presence in the shed is part of a secret, 
unlikely, and harmless plot in which the future in-law is a willing participant. 
 
In most circumstances, if all that a person gets wrong are the facts, then her false beliefs—
i.e., her ignorance—should excuse her action. Although Boko owes the businessman an 
apology, he is not blameworthy for his action because he has the excuse “But I thought you 
were a burglar.” The racist, however, does not presumably have a similar excuse. Consider, 
for example, the anti-semite who has the false belief Jews are members of a worldwide conspiracy set 
on world domination. Arpaly argues that the anti-semite does not have the analogous excuse 
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“But I thought you were a member of worldwide conspiracy set on world domination.” This 
is an asymmetry in need of explanation. That is, we need to explain why some false beliefs 
excuse actions, whereas other false beliefs do not. 
 
Arpaly argues that the answer has to do with a difference in the epistemic rationality of Boko's 
belief as opposed to the epistemic irrationality exhibited by anyone's belief, in this day and age, 
that people of Jewish descent are part of worldwide conspiracy set on world domination. 
Whereas it is epistemically rational to believe of a man hiding in your shed at night and who 
refuses to identify himself that he is up to no good, she argues that unless you have just 
arrived on Earth from another planet with a seriously flawed travel guide, it is difficult to 
reach the belief that all people of Jewish descent are involved in a worldwide conspiracy set 
on world domination. Whereas the first is an honest mistake, it is difficult for the latter belief 
to be an honest mistake. This is because many of the people who hold such beliefs have met 
Jewish people, know of historical events motivated by such beliefs, and are able to see the 
unlikely nature of such a conspiracy. So, rather than being an honest mistake, their beliefs 
seem to be the result of motivated irrationality.16 
 
This, however, is still not enough. Although some irrational beliefs are morally objectionable, 
Arpaly recognizes that this does not hold in general. She argues that the person who 
irrationally believes of their lottery ticket that it will win is not being morally vicious in the 
same way as the anti-semite. If irrationality in a belief is not sufficient for moral 
condemnation, what is? Arpaly and Schroeder (2014, pp. 235) argue that the difference is 
that the bigot’s irrationality is “hot” irrationality.  
 
We agree with Kwame Anthony Appiah that the racist's irrationality is motivated 
irrationality. His thinking that the Jews are a conspiratorial people is more likely 
to be caused by his hatred of them, or of people who are ostentatiously “other,” 
or to be caused by his resentment of his low social station, or the like. And the 
fact that the racist's belief appears to be caused by a desire opens the possibility 
that, however involuntary, the belief might have something to do with ill will or 
moral indifference. 
 
According to this account, prejudiced beliefs are morally vicious when they are held as a 
result of moral indifference. Returning to our challenger, Spencer, he might not think that he 
is a racist or a bigot because he is just believing in accordance with the evidence, but that is 
not why he believes. If that is what he reports, he is guilty of bad faith or motivated 
irrationality. He is just ready to believe anything of a particular group as long as it is bad. 
 
																																																								
16 She reiterates this point in Arpaly and Schroeder (2014, pp. 234) when she asks, so, what’s the difference 
between the ordinary racist, i.e. the one who deserves condemnation, and the alien racist who does not? 
One difference that springs to mind is the fact that the Earthly racist holds his belief in, e.g. the 
supremacy of the majority Chinese ethnicity against plentiful evidence that is readily available to 
him. With a typical level of intelligence and with the information that is available to rather 
uneducated people in the first world, he would probably not have developed his racist beliefs if 
there were not something amiss with him epistemically. The run-of-the-mill racist is 
epistemically irrational, as are other run-of-the-mill prejudiced people.  
 
Please cite the final version. 
	 15	
This is a strong claim to make about the psychology of such persons. It puts us in a difficult 
position when arguing with the supposedly rational racist. Firstly, it makes for an 
uncharitable exchange. Second, when they inevitably deny the description, we're led to a sort 
of foot-stomping on which neither can convince the other. We would be in a stronger 
dialectical position if we were to grant that they are not believing in bad faith, or due to 
motivated irrationality, and still point out how their belief wrongs. This, recall, is the 
motivation for the working constraint on acceptable answers to the supposedly rational 
racist, i.e., that we grant Spencer his conception of himself.  
 
Not only would we be in a dialectically advantageous position in response to the supposedly 
rational racist if we meet this constraint, but also there is another problem with restricting 
the class of beliefs that can wrong to beliefs that exhibit hot irrationality. An overreliance on 
the hot condition can obscure other cases of beliefs that wrong. For example, consider 
Valian (2005)’s account of the gender disparity in philosophy, which she calls a “cold” social-
cognitive account given that it concerns the beliefs we come to hold on the basis of evidence 
that seems well-founded given our environment, e.g., assuming that the man at a table is 
more likely to be the CEO than a woman given that a disproportionate number of CEOs are 
men. As she notes, her account is “intended to explain what goes wrong in environments 
where nothing seems to be wrong, where people genuinely and sincerely espouse egalitarian 
beliefs and are well-intentioned, where few men or women overtly harass women” (Valian 
2005, pp. 1). Furthermore, it is now well-documented that although it is tempting to think 
that the racist suffers from ill will or a deficiency of good will, racial injustice can survive and 
even thrive in the absence of such negative non-cognitive attitudes. Racism can come in cold 
varieties as well as hot varieties (see Bonilla-Silva 2009). The hot condition, then, is not 
necessary for identifying the moral wrong of racism. This is why it is not only a dialectical 
advantage if we can provide an account that doesn't undermine Spencer’s conception of 
himself, this really ought be a constraint on any acceptable answer to what Spencer does 
wrong when he believes what he believes. 
 
5. A Final Hurdle: A Worry About Control 
My aim in this paper has been to present a case—the case of the supposedly rational racist—
that pushes us to seriously rethink why we reject the naïve thesis that beliefs can wrong. I've 
argued that this case forces us to reconsider why we are so resistant to the idea that I could 
wrong you by believing something of you that I seem to be justified in believing. The 
challenge posed by the supposedly rational racist is a challenge concerning our epistemic 
practices in a non-ideal world. A common refrain throughout this paper has been the 
following: the world is an unjust place and there may be many morally objectionable beliefs 
that it justifies. As a result, the evidence might be stacked in favor of racist beliefs. The world 
we inhabit is a racist one, so it is no surprise then that some of our beliefs are racist as well. 
 
If our best accounts of the way racist beliefs can wrong require the believer to always act on 
the belief before we call the belief wrong or require the believer to be distorting the truth, 
misrepresenting reality, organizing facts in a misleading way, or engaging in fallacious 
reasoning, then these accounts will fail to meet the challenge posed by the supposedly 
rational racist. Spencer appears to be responding to the evidence in a way that seems 
epistemically rational. This is why I suggest that we stop looking elsewhere for what wrong 
Spencer commits. The question I am interested in is what happens when we take seriously 
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the thought that Spencer wrongs the black diner in his section in virtue of what he believes 
of the diner.  
 
There is a final hurdle to clear to establish the plausibility that beliefs can wrong. This hurdle 
is the assumption that moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack with 
regard to our beliefs. As we have seen, this background assumption is the motivating force 
behind the attempts to locate the wrong committed by Spencer either in the downstream 
effects of the belief or somewhere causally upstream from the belief itself. My argument 
against this assumption will be short and indirect. As I shall show, there is more intuitive 
plausibility to the thought that the supposedly rational racist wrongs given what he believes 
than there is to the thought that voluntary control is required to wrong.  
 
The problem of control can be presented as follows. Although we may talk in everyday 
discourse about what people should believe, deontic notions such as ought and should and 
moral notions such as praise and blame do not apply in the domain of epistemology. The 
argument goes as follows. 
 
1. For deontological concepts such as obligation or duty to apply in the domain of 
epistemology, agents need to have voluntary control over their beliefs. 
2. It is not the case that we have sufficient voluntary control over our beliefs for 
deontological concepts such as obligation or duty to apply in the domain of 
epistemology 
3. Therefore, deontological concepts such as obligation or duty do not apply in the 
domain of epistemology. 
 
To briefly canvas various arguments against the idea that we either lack control or that we 
even need control for these deontic notions to apply, Shah (2002) rejects (2) on the grounds 
that we exert control over our beliefs in the following way: through our appreciation of the 
evidence we are agents with regard to our beliefs and are capable of regulating our beliefs. 
Steup (2000) similarly argues that our beliefs are responsive to epistemic reasons and in this 
way we exercise control over our beliefs. Further, Weatherson (2008) has persuasively argued 
that this argument relies on too narrow a conception of voluntary, and Flowerree (2016) 
presents the following reductio to establish that we are agents with respect to our beliefs: if 
we are not agents with respect to our beliefs, then we are not agents with respect to our 
intentions.  
 
Others have also argued that (1) is false, i.e. for deontological concepts to apply, control is 
not needed. For example, Hieronymi (2006, 2008) argues that it is not troubling to say that 
we can no more intend at will than believe at will. She further rejects that voluntary control 
is required for deontic notions to apply. McHugh (2012) similarly argues that voluntariness is 
not a central condition. In general, these strategies have taken the following form: they show 
that for deontological concepts to apply in the domain of epistemology, either we have 
sufficient control or there is no control needed for deontological concepts to apply (for 
more on this point, see Basu and Schroeder Forthcoming). 
 
What we are left with is the following choice. Should we give Spencer a pass on the basis of 
a theoretical technicality that is both (a) not as intuitively obvious as it is commonly 
regarded, and (b) does a disservice to the common folk-intuition that something has gone 
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wrong in the case of Spencer? Our choice is between saying that Spencer is not wronging at 
all or that Spencer wrongs through what he believes. The main consideration preventing us 
from saying the latter is this theoretical normative posit that voluntary control is always 
required to wrong. However, this intuition is more esoteric and has less claim to be either 
the intuition of the folk or share widespread acceptance amongst philosophers than the 
intuition that I have been defending: that Spencer does something wrong. To conclude, I 
hope to have convinced the reader that we should take seriously the thought that people 
wrong people in virtue of what they believe about each other, and not just in virtue of what 
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